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INTRODUCTION
Roberts v. United States Jaycees1 held that it was constitutionally permissible for 
Minnesota to require the Jaycees, as a public accommodation, to desegregate and to admit 
women.  Boy Scouts v. Dale2 held that it was constitutionally impermissible for New Jersey 
to require the Boy Scouts, as a public accommodation, to remain partly desegregated by 
permitting an openly gay Scoutmaster to remain in the organization.  It is not surprising that 
Dale has caused gnashing of teeth by those who applauded Roberts v. Jaycees: the 
commitment to integration seemed all too limited.  Women counted; gays and lesbians did 
not.  
Such an analysis is natural but too quick.  Much greater dental destruction should have 
resulted both from Jaycees and from Dale.  Those who support Roberts v. Jaycees should 
have been chilled by Dale, not entirely because of its outcome, but because the reasoning of 
Dale and the debate between the justices was entirely foreshadowed by Justice Brennan's 
opinion in Jaycees. The opinions in Boy Scouts v. Dale3 and in particular the dissenting 
opinions of the liberal justices, follow the lead of Justice Brennan.  In so doing, they reflect 
and forward a view of freedom of association that, while familiar, is importantly and 
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unpalatably incomplete.  Roberts v. Jaycees was correctly decided, but the rationale that 
Brennan crafted corrodes our commitments to freedom of expression and association.
In this essay, I will pursue this claim: that Justice Brennan’s opinion in Jaycees reflects 
and has reinforced an approach to the freedom of association that denigrates its value and 
implicitly distorts its intimate connection to freedom of speech.  The mistake, or at least the 
omission it represents, parallels a similar error in a common articulation of the objection to 
compelled speech.   Drawing upon a core, but under-emphasized, aspect of liberalism, I will 
try to make out a more persuasive case against compelled speech that, concomitantly, makes 
greater sense out of certain freedom of association claims and reveals a more intimate 
connection between freedom of speech values and freedom of association claims than 
standard models recognize.
Specifically, I will argue that the fundamental wrong of compelled speech in cases such 
as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette4 has less to do with its external effects 
– the possibility of outsiders misunderstanding a person’s compelled speech as his own – and 
has more to do with concerns about the illicit influence compelled speech may have on the 
character and autonomous thinking process of the speaker who is compelled and about 
governmental efforts, however fruitless, to influence thinkers in this way.  Similarly, the 
disvalue of compelled association is not fully captured by analyses that look to the risk that 
outsiders will misunderstand the association’s message or that the organization's message 
will somehow become garbled and less intelligible either to outsiders or insiders.  
Associations have an intimate connection to freedom of speech values not solely because 
they are mechanisms for message dissemination or sites for the pursuit of shared aims.  
Associations have an intimate connection to freedom of speech values in large part because 
they are special sorts of sites for the generation of thoughts and ideas.  As with compelled 
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speech, our concern should be turned partly inward rather than exclusively outward.  The 
main risk to freedom of speech of compelled association has to do with the effect on the 
internal life of the association and not merely the impression it makes on outsiders.  
I will also, more tentatively, advance a second claim about Dale: that the most interesting 
questions about the case were not raised and thoroughly pursued.  What ought to have been 
mooted in Dale was not the issue of whether the inclusion of Dale, a gay Boy Scout leader, 
into the group would distort its message, but whether an association primarily of children and 
for children should enjoy the same form of protection of freedom of association as that 
properly extended to adult groups.
I. RETHINKING THE DISVALUE OF ASSOCIATION
A. The Narrow Model of Association's Value and Its Distorting Effect on Freedom of 
Speech Analysis
To start: what’s wrong, on the surface, with the reasoning in Dale?  Boy Scouts v. Dale
considered a First Amendment challenge against the application of a New Jersey public 
accommodations law to block the expulsion of a gay Boy Scouts leader from the Boy Scouts.  
The Court, in a 5-4 majority, found that the compelled inclusion of Dale violated the Boy 
Scouts’ First Amendment rights of association.  The main issues dividing the majority and 
the dissent were first, whether Dale’s compelled inclusion in the Boy Scouts would alter the 
message of the Boy Scouts and second, whether it was clear that the Boy Scouts really did 
have a message that involved the rejection of homosexuality.5
5
 Because the majority found that Dale’s inclusion would substantially alter the Boy Scouts’ message, it did 
not reach the question of whether there was a compelling state interest in preventing discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation.  It thereby bypassed some quite interesting questions about what constitutes a state interest 
and, specifically, whether the 'state' in 'state interest' refers generically to governmental interests or whether it 
refers, abstractly or concretely, to the interests of the particular governmental entities on whose behalf they were 
This methodology grows straight out of Justice Brennan’s approach in Jaycees.  In 
Jaycees, Justice Brennan began his analysis by distinguishing between intimate association 
rights and those association rights connected to the First Amendment.  The latter garners civil 
protection “as a means” preserving other liberties.6  While he acknowledged overlap between 
the categories, Justice Brennan located the boundary between intrinsically valuable 
associations and instrumentally valuable associations as that between intimate and expressive 
associations.7 The boundary may be identified by the smallness, selectivity and seclusion of 
being asserted.  These questions intersect with issues concerning federalism; whether 'state' is interpreted 
generically or as admitting to an interpretation that is more parochial may impact the degree of freedom states 
enjoy to experiment and pursue distinctive modes of government and regulation.   Here, the lurking issue was 
whether states may declare certain goals to be state interests or compelling interests even when the federal 
government and federal courts have declined to find such interests themselves.  At the time, the federal 
government and the federal courts had taken an equivocal view on discrimination against gay people as 
exemplified by the tension between Bowers, DOMA, don't ask, don't tell, and the President’s endorsement of an 
amendment banning same-sex marriage on the one hand and Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Thomas on the 
other.     
In identifying this issue, I do not mean to suggest that New Jersey did not have the power to declare that 
preventing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a compelling state interest.  Rather, I just mean to 
call attention to some of the difficult issues connected to a test that renders the contours of a federal 
constitutional right possibly subject to determination, in part, by the declaration of a state that it has a particular 
goal that it regards as compelling but that is not necessarily shared by the federal government.  This problem did 
not arise in Jaycees because Minnesota’s declared interest in preventing sex discrimination was officially shared 
by the federal government.  
While the issue cannot be treated here, the contours of and conditions on being a state interest merit further 
thought.  Similar difficulties to the ones described above may arise in cases involving the various interests in 
controlling or preventing the ability to control the means of death.  Here, there may be diametric opposition 
between the interests different states declare (compare Oregon and Washington) and the interests declared by the 
federal government and some states (cite Oregon dispute).  These disparities are enormously interesting 
especially in light of the feature of the compelling state interest test that requires some independent judgment by 
the judiciary as to whether, from the federal perspective, the state interest should be regarded as compelling.   
While I suggest above that a non-generic interpretation of state interest may support the experimentation values 
associated with federalism, such an approach may also limit the power of states.  It might require, for instance, 
some real evidence of the state's commitment to the interest it espouses and this may require greater evidentiary 
showings than are typical; also, for better or for worse, such an approach might be in tension with some aspects 
of the notion that legislative intent is irrelevant.  See U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).   In Justice Thomas' 
dissenting opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, Thomas's analysis of Michigan's state interest seemed implicitly to 
endorse the parochial interpretation and to suggest another potential limitation, namely that a state's interest is 
limited to what happens within its geographical borders.  Thomas reasoned that because most University of 
Michigan graduates practice outside of the state, Michigan cannot claim a state interest in the diversity of the law 
school's students.  Grutter, 539 U.S. ___ (2003), 2003 U.S. Lexis 4800, at *119-*122.  While Thomas' suggestion 
that a state's declared interest must bear a substantive relationship to the actual state's interests may be plausible, 
his application of this condition seems overly constrained.  Michigan might well have an interest in contributing 
strong lawyers to the national pool, to attracting strong legal minds to the state, to building a great university 
where legal ideas are developed, and to building a strong reputation--even if the lawyers it produces ultimately 
relocate.
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the former.8  The Jaycees did not have these features, being a large, national, decentralized, 
‘basically unselective’ group.
Thus, the Jaycees did not qualify for the protections afforded intimate (and in Brennan’s 
view, intrinsically valuable) associations.  The question was whether the compelled inclusion 
of women unconstitutionally infringed their (instrumentally valuable) freedom of expressive 
association.  If it did burden freedom of association, then a regulation compelling inclusion 
would only be permissible if an infringement served a compelling state interest unrelated to 
the suppression of ideas and one that could not be achieved through less restrictive means.9
The regulation at issue, Brennan announced, advanced the interest of equality “through the 
least restrictive means,” for no demonstration was made that the inclusion of women 
“imposes any serious burdens on the male members’ freedom of association.”10  Minnesota’s 
purpose was not to suppress ideas “or to hamper the organization’s ability to express its 
views,” but to eliminate discrimination.11He assessed whether a burden on expressive 
association was imposed by looking to whether the regulation directly affected the 
organization’s ability to engage in outward endeavors, such as civic or charitable lobbying 
and fundraising activities or “to disseminate its preferred views.”12  The regulation would not 
require the Jaycees to alter their creed to promote men’s interests nor would it prevent their 
adopting selection criteria that excluded people with adverse views from their own.
Brennan's approach seemed to reduce to two questions.  First, did the regulation of 
expressive association promote a compelling state interest, one unrelated to the suppression 
8
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of ideas? And, second, was this interest promoted in the least restrictive way, i.e. in a way 
that did not disrupt the outward expressive activities of the group or prevent the group from 
excluding those with evident views in conflict with the association’s message?13  Such an 
approach naturally yielded the opinions in Dale, which focus on whether the Boy Scouts 
indeed had a publicly promulgated message that was critical of homosexuality and whether 
the ability to exclude openly gay people was necessary to maintain that message.14
On its face, the dispute between the majority and the dissent about how strong the 
opposition to homosexuality need be for the Boy Scouts to be construed as having a message 
critical of homosexuality is destructive both of free speech aims and of progressive aims.  I 
begin with what is mistaken about the more extreme pole on the divide: the dissent’s 
position.  The dissent took the view that the Boy Scouts did not have a clear message 
standing for the rejection of homosexuality, and, therefore that the application of the New 
Jersey accommodations law to the Scouts would not threaten their expressive association 
interests. The mission statement of the Boy Scouts extolled its ‘representative membership’ 
and its inclusionary policies.15  While, as the majority and the Boy Scouts noted, the Scout 
Oath and Scout Law do stress moral straightness and being clean, neither of these qualities is 
implicitly or explicitly contrasted with having a particular sexual orientation.16  The 
Scoutmasters’ handbook encourages Scoutmasters to avoid giving detailed advice or 
proffering specific opinions about sexuality; it nowhere declares that Scoutmasters should 
take a position on homosexuality, much less a negative one.  In light of the Scouts’ 
declarations of inclusiveness and their silence on the matter in key venues, the dissent 
claimed that the Boy Scouts’ explicit statements of opposition to homosexuality (or 
13
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sometimes, more narrowly, to the employment of gay leaders) were insufficient to establish 
that the Boy Scouts did actually take that stand on the matter.   Instead, “[a]t a minimum, a 
group seeking to prevail over an antidiscrimination law must adhere to a clear and 
unequivocal view.”17  Further, such a view must have been adopted prior to any action on 
that view for the dissent criticizes the Boy Scouts’ later, more articulate policy statements 
opposing homosexuality because they were adopted after the fact.18
This is a troubling and counterproductive standard of what it is to voice a message -- all 
the more troubling given the dissent’s sympathies.  For it suggests that if a group has an 
interest in retaining control over its membership, it should take strong, unequivocal stances 
and repeat them loudly and publicly.   Such a standard discourages the toleration within
groups of dissent, experimentation, and critical re-examination of their stances.19  On this 
standard, the presence of alternate voices or periods of experimentation may be cited as 
evidence that the group’s commitment to a particular message is insufficiently sturdy to 
support an argument for exclusion.   Such a standard encourages extremism in the 
articulation of a group message and encourages fear of internal criticism.  Ironically, the 
dissent’s standard would discourage the sorts of gradual, tentative steps associated with 
genuine intellectual and emotional change and lasting social progress.  Groups who tolerate 
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discussion and movement in the direction of openness are more likely to lose control over 
their membership than those who adopt a posture of unyielding stridency.   Such a result 
cannot really serve the goals of those who prize freedom of speech or those who prize 
inclusive, egalitarian, anti-bigoted values.  If these standards have play, it is unclear how 
productive, effective change and evolution in perspective are to occur in associations who 
care about control over the composition of their memberships.20
Not only are the dissent’s standards for what it is to voice a message counterproductive 
with respect to furthering egalitarian goals, they are intrinsically peculiar tests of what it is to 
stand for something and what it is to say something – to have and impart a message.  The 
requirements of consistency, articulateness, and constancy implied by the dissent’s analysis 
of whether the Boy Scouts had a message are extremely demanding standards.  Consider how 
peculiar these standards would be in another freedom of speech context.  We would not, for 
example, contemplate defending a claim of viewpoint-discrimination by challenging whether 
a censored speaker really, sincerely held the viewpoint or whether his expression of a point of 
view was coherently stated, free from contradiction, hesitation, or the suggestion of doubts.  
It would seem irrelevant to an effort to refute a claim of viewpoint discrimination that a 
censored speaker had recently held a different point of view, had only equivocally voiced 
support for the disfavored viewpoint, or had later adopted a different point of view.  None of 
these things would establish that the particular message that was censored had not really been 
voiced at all, that no speech had taken place, or that no speech with that content had taken 
place. 
20
 Some have suggested that the requirement that one articulate clearly a bigoted message may serve as a 
disincentive for those groups who forswear that reputation.  The choice to either appear intolerant or to lose 
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strategy would backfire where control over membership takes priority for a group.   I argue later that there may 
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Of course, the dissent was attempting to police the boundary between excluding members 
in order to reflect and express a sincerely held viewpoint and pretextual claims of expressive 
purpose that disguise discrimination undertaken for reasons that have nothing to do with the 
association’s commitments, policies, and stances.   And, if the standard of protection turns on 
whether or not regulations on association distort one’s message, requirements that one have 
voiced the viewpoint clearly and over time are understandable criteria one would adopt to 
attempt to exclude pretextual justifications.  But though they are understandable criteria, they 
seem dangerous. This is partly for the reasons I have articulated and partly because they 
would involve judges engaging in fairly detailed, intrusive forms of interpretative review of 
what an organization really stands for, what sorts of dissent and difference would really
threaten that stance, what is really entailed by a policy statement, what it would really mean 
to be opposed to homosexuality, and how someone who was really opposed to it on 
ideological grounds would speak – how volubly, on what grounds, in what fora.21  While 
such reviews may not themselves preclude the adoption of dissenting views, they involve a 
form of judicial scriptwriting that is antithetical to a thorough-going concern about judicial 
imposition of content and the free exploration and articulation of ideas.22 
This is not to argue that there is a more precise, better way of identifying the boundary 
between sincere and pretextual claims that an organization’s exclusion of members of a 
group was pursuant to or expressive of one of its messages. But, it seems damning that the 
21
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dissent’s efforts to identify this boundary threaten to yield a large range of false negatives by 
failing to recognize tentative, equivocal, rarely voiced, yet sincere, claims as sincere.  
The majority provides a more plausible analysis of what it takes to stand for something or 
to articulate a point of view.  However, the permissiveness of their standard makes it 
vulnerable to false positives – pretextual justifications for discrimination will appear to be 
exclusion motivated by adherence to a message or point of view.  It is unclear how an 
organization run by reasonably intelligent people could ever fail this test.   
I doubt that this problem is soluble.  I suspect that the problem is not that the wrong 
measure of what distinguishes pretext from message was adopted, but rather, that the idea 
that the boundaries of freedom of association should turn on this distinction was misguided in 
the first place.  
In retrospect, it didn’t make much more sense when it was introduced.  Let’s return to the 
argument made by Justice Brennan in Jaycees: that since inclusion of women would not 
affect the message of the Jaycees, compelled inclusion of women did not unreasonably 
threaten their freedom of association interests.  It’s hard, actually, to articulate an 
interpretation of this position that seems plausible and attractive.  On the one hand, the Court 
could be re-interpreting the meaning of the Jaycees’ mission statement:
“to promote and foster…young men’s civic organizations…to provide [young 
men] with opportunity for personal development and achievement…and an 
avenue…for participation…in [civic and national affairs]…and to develop 
true friendship and understanding among young men and all nations,”23
to suggest that the Jaycees didn’t really mean to be committed to the interests of young men 
as such, that ‘young men’ could be read as ‘young people’ or that this wasn’t a particularly 
important part of its mission. But such an interpretation would seem difficult to sustain in the 
23
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face of the organization’s insistence that it did mean what it literally said; to challenge the 
authority of the speaker here would involve appeal to an extremely overbearing, Pollyannic, 
paternalist theory of meaning.  On the other hand, the Court could be resting upon the 
observation that women could easily be dedicated to the promotion of the interests of young 
men and that their inclusion need not necessitate any deviation from this mission.   It is a fine 
logical point to be sure, but, sociologically, it is naïve to put a lot of weight on the idea that 
there was a group of professional young women chomping at the bit to lend a hand and 
participate equally in furthering the interests of young business men.  And, whatever its 
merits, it is a bizarre place, normatively, to take a logical stand.  
As a matter of fact, the inclusion of women in the Jaycees has gone hand in hand with an 
alteration of the mission statements of Jaycee organizations.24  This isn’t a surprise, and it 
shouldn’t come as one to egalitarians. Much of the point of anti-discrimination and 
desegregation efforts depends on the idea that the integration of and exposure to excluded 
groups will affect people’s thinking.  Interacting with members of a different race or gender 
exposes one more vividly to their points of view, serves to humanize a group that has been 
caricatured and stereotyped, and makes one less likely to ignore or downplay their interests 
and concerns.  Surely the impetus behind the compelled inclusion of women in the Jaycees 
was not the idea that not only men but women too should have an equal opportunity to 
promote the interests of young men.  It was rather that the integration of women into the 
organization and organizations like it would have a salutary influence on how organizations 
such as the Jaycees devoted their energies and conceived of their missions: they would come 
to include women not only as their members but as the beneficiaries of their efforts.  It is 
hard, I think, to deny this point while nevertheless representing the state interest of 
integration of women here as a compelling one: how could the state really think that there 
24
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was a compelling state interest in ensuring that willing women had equal access to promoting 
the interests of young men as such?
This overview has been brief, but I hope it conveys the flavor of why I believe the 
Brennan approach in Jaycees is disingenuous and counterproductive to the protection of both 
freedom of speech and equality.  It is disingenuous because no plausible understanding of the 
compelling state interest at stake could be reconciled with the idea that its pursuit would not 
distort any robust understanding of what the Jaycee’s message was.  And such an approach is 
ultimately counter-productive to the simultaneous pursuit of the protection of freedom of 
expression and equality, because: either one will take the dissent’s path--a path that creates 
implausibly rigid standards for what is it to engage in expression and that simultaneously 
generates incentives for organizations to articulate and to impose internally, intolerant, 
unyielding attitudes that discourage dissent and experimentation; or, one will take the 
majority’s path, which adopts a more plausible, permissive standard for what it is to articulate 
a message but in do doing renders association membership immune to anti-discrimination 
regulation.  After Dale, it is hard to understand how, on the majority’s reasoning, Jaycees is 
not in trouble.
Given what I believe is the hopelessness of the Brennan approach, how can one explain 
its emergence?  One might cynically explain the Dale majority’s attachment to it--as I have 
suggested, the approach ultimately undermines the purposes to which it was put.  But this, of 
course, does not explain Brennan’s position.  I suspect that Brennan’s approach is grounded 
in a well-meaning effort to connect freedom of association to freedom of speech.  However, 
his analysis - in particular, his dichotomy between intrinsically and instrumentally valuable 
associations, - rests upon a constrictive understanding of the First Amendment value of 
freedom of association.  Justice Brennan concomitantly imagines an overly narrow range of 
the dangers of compelled association, one that only locates the possible dangers of compelled 
association outward, by concentrating on the potential alteration or distortion of the 
relationship between the association and the outside world that compelled association may 
occasion.  By contrast, I believe the more pressing danger of compulsion is the effect it may 
have on the internal life of the association.  Furthermore, such effects implicate First 
Amendment interests, not just the relational values served by associational membership.    
To make these claims, I will argue that Brennan’s dichotomy between intrinsically 
valuable forms of association and instrumentally valuable forms of association too quickly 
locates expressive associations in the latter category.  Expressive associations may also have 
intrinsic value from a freedom of speech perspective. Before making out the fuller account of 
the connection between associational freedom and the First Amendment, I will prefigure the 
shift that I advocate for freedom of association analysis, from an exclusively outward 
perspective to one that also stresses an inward perspective, by illustrating how the same shift 
in orientation can better explain the constitutional protection against compelled speech 
represented by Barnette.  Just as we should reconceive how we articulate the rationale for the 
Barnette protection, so we should re-think the rationale for Jaycees. 
B. Compelled Speech
Arguments against compelled speech by individuals often take a form analogous to the 
form of argument against compelled association voiced in Jaycees and then echoed in Dale.
A common way to understand the rationale behind cases like West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette25 and Wooley v. Maynard26 is that they protect individuals from having 
to speak in ways that lead to their being misunderstood by others.27 These rulings protect 
25
  319 U.S. 624, 625 (1943) (finding a First Amendment right against compelled recitation of the flag salute)
26
  430 U.S 705 (1976) (recognizing  a First Amendment right against being compelled to have the state 
motto “Live Free or Die” on one’s license plate).
27
  The argument about compelled speech extends and deepens a position initially introduced in Vincent Blasi 
and Seana Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, in Michael Dorf, ed., 
individuals from having to attest to beliefs that they reject and thus from having others 
wrongly associate them with those ideas or beliefs.  This is not a negligible concern, to be 
sure, but as many have pointed out, it is unclear whether this interest was powerfully 
implicated in cases like Barnette and Wooley.  If a certain speech act is required of everyone 
and it is publicly known that it is required, it would unwarranted for any reasonable observer 
to infer that any particular utterance of the required speech reflected the sincere, genuine 
thoughts of the utterer.   If citizens are required to be associated with a particular message 
and this requirement is known, then the reasonable observer should conclude that the 
message may be only the state’s, not the particular citizen’s.  If the occasions for compelled 
speech are clearly delineated, then there is no substantial worry that a citizen’s message will 
be misunderstood or even that she will be taken to be communicating at all.   
The force of this critique can be over-stated.  Outsiders who are unaware of the legal 
convention may mistake compelled utterances for voluntary ones.  As some of my students 
have insisted, tourists to New Hampshire might not know the license plates’ messages were 
state-dictated and might mistakenly infer a citizenry that was united behind a radical civil 
libertarianism.  More plausibly, the reception of a voluntarily uttered message may be 
affected when that message is sometimes compelled.  An audience savvy to the fact that the 
utterance is compelled in some contexts may not recognize it as voluntarily delivered in 
others.  The voluntary utterance may be mistakenly taken to be a compelled utterance or as 
an ironic comment on the compelled utterance.  Ironically, those who agree with the content 
of the compelled utterance may have a greater complaint against its compulsion than 
dissenters.  The former’s ability to communicate their sincerity may be compromised by its 
sometimes being compelled. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT TEN LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 433, 454-461 
(2004).
Nevertheless, the critique that compelled speech is unlikely to result in significant 
misunderstanding has a fair amount of force.  The worry about misunderstanding seems 
slight -- at least where it is clear that the speech is compelled and the circumstances when it is 
compelled are reasonably well-defined, discrete, and obvious to observers.  This does not 
mean that Wooley and Barnette were incorrectly decided. Rather, there are two superior 
justifications for their holdings.
The mistaken message theory focuses on what the audience to the compelled speech will 
infer and how it impacts the interest of the speaker in not being misunderstood. Two related, 
alternative theories focus entirely on the speaker and her interest in what she comes to think 
and to say in the first place, prior to her interest in being properly understood in 
communication.  
Let’s posit that a speaker has an interest in how she comes to produce messages - in how 
she thinks about subjects, and in reasoning about them sincerely and authentically.  That is, 
the speaker has an interest in trying to come to conclusions about matters by thinking 
‘straight’ about the relevant considerations that bear on the subjects.  Compelled speech 
threatens to interfere with the pursuit of this interest.  Take the flag salute as an example: one 
may worry that compulsory repetition of that message over and over again will have an 
influence on what and how one thinks.  The message will become familiar to one.  Its 
regularity may become a comfort and an internal source of authority for consultation.  What 
one says may have an influence on what and how one thinks: the things one finds oneself 
regularly doing and saying will have an understandable impact on what subjects one thinks 
about; their regular presence in one’s speech and related action may predictably have an 
influence on what topics seem salient.  Further, they may have an influence on how one 
thinks about what one thinks about.  Commonly heard sentiments may become comfortable 
sentiments. Commonly voiced sentiments bear an even more intimate relation to the self.
The notion that what one says has a bidirectional relation to one’s thought - that is, that 
what one says may influence and not merely reflect what one thinks - (as well as the thought 
that this may be a matter of concern) is familiar to feminists.  Feminists, as well as anti-
racists, have been pointing out (somewhat successfully for the most part) that how we speak 
(as well as what we hear) has an influence on how we think.28  The persistent use of the male 
pronoun for the generic person may make one may more inclined to assume that a person 
whose gender is unknown is a man; one may tend to have men in mind as the generic agent.  
One’s linguistic patterns may serve as a reference when one lacks information – how one 
tends to talk may serve as mental evidence for how an item about which there is uncertainty 
is likely to be. 
This point is connected to the use of intuitions in moral methodology. It is common, 
when deliberating ethically, to consult one’s intuitions or moral sense – to try to assess how 
we feel about an action or a situation and to think about how we are inclined to characterize it 
and speak about it.  For example, discussions about the removal of aid in cases of euthanasia 
or abortion sometimes begin with someone saying: “we wouldn’t call that a killing.” Such 
intuitions may not be (and in the long run should not be) treated as dispositive, but they often 
provide starting points for ethical thought,29 set the moral agenda, and provide at least prima 
facie considerations about action.  The use of such intuitions in moral theory is still 
somewhat under-theorized.  Charitably interpreted, though, appeal to such intuitions is not an 
effort to gain direct sense perception of moral properties or qualities.  Rather, the implicit 
theory behind such appeals is, I believe, that one’s intuitions about and common ways of 
characterizing actual or posited situations are compressed, inchoate forms of reasoning in 
28
 See e.g., Mykol Hamilton, “Using Masculine Generics: Does Generic He Increase Male Bias in the User’s 
Imagery?”  19 Sex Roles (1988) 785, 795, 798 (conducting an empirical study on the use of the masculine 
pronoun v. gender neutral pronouns and finding that ‘use of the masculine pronoun per se increases male bias’ by 
the  language user)
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  Compare with Barbara Herman, “The  Practice of Moral Judgment,” in The Practice of Moral Judgment. 
which a wealth of experience and sensible reactions to experience are embedded.  Through 
experience and acculturation, people navigate a wide range of ethical situations, make 
judgments and learn from others’ actions and reactions.  Their intuitions often reflect their 
unarticulated deliberative reactions to such situations and well as rationalizations of their own 
experience and action.
That what one says and how one behaves may have an influence on thought is also the 
aspiration of some counsels of religious practice.  On some common understandings of the 
Jewish faith, practice may precede and cause faith.  One is counseled to engage in the ritual 
expressive of a belief even if one lacks the belief.  The hope is that the practice of the ritual 
may lead one over time to develop the belief, even when arguments and direct efforts to 
induce the belief fail.30 Similarly, though it may not be their aspiration, some actors find that 
they take on (often temporarily) some of the habits, character traits, and perspectives of the 
characters they play.31  Some even report finding themselves thinking as their characters 
30
 See Maimonides, Guide to the Perplexed, cite; Bachya ibn Pakuda, The Duties of the Heart (transl. 
Yaalkov Feldman) (1996), cite.  See generally Nachum Amsel, The Jewish Encyclopedia of Moral and Ethical 
Issues (1994), pp. 176-181 (discussing Exodus 24:7, Maimonides and idea that performing mitzvot will be 
followed by and provoke an understanding of the meaning of the practices and not the reverse order).  See also S. 
Schechter, Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology, (NY: MacMillan, 1969), p. 161 (arguing that the ideal is to obey 
law for its own sake but that those unable to do so should still study Torah and fulfill the commandments, “for 
this occupation will lead in the end to the desired ideal of the purer intention.”); Edward L. Greenstein, “Dietary 
Laws,” in ed. David Lieber, Etz Hayim (Rabbinical Assembly: New York) (2001) (1460-4) at 1460, 1464 
(dietary practices are meant “to instill the idea that life belongs to God”; unlike Christian views, the Torah holds 
that the physical and spiritual are not separate; “the many meanings that are encoded within [dietary] behaviors 
are meant to act on and cultivate the ethical and spiritual dimensions of those who observe them” [emphasis 
added]).  Some interpret this effect as occurring not with the person but within the community.  The practice has 
associational effects.  See supra note _.  This is only one reading.  It may be that on Maimonides’ view, the 
ritual’s practice cultivates awareness  of and perhaps confidence in one’s always present but latent belief.
A different view challenges in a deeper way the division between faith and practice.  On this view, there is no 
separation between practice and faith such that one could practice in a certain way contrary to faith but still retain 
one’s faith. On this view, to be faithful just is to act in certain ways.  See notes to Exodus 14:31, Etz Hayim 405 
“In the Hebrew Bible, ‘faith’ does not mean belief in a doctrine or a creed. It refers to trust and loyalty expressed 
through commitment and obedience.” 
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 The idea is a familiar one (which is not to say that its familiarity renders it true).  Some examples: Writing 
about the effect that her immersion into roles had, Shakespearean actress Zoe Caldwell remarked: “It takes me 
usually six months to regain my self, my life.”  Zoe Caldwell, I Will Be Cleopatra (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2001), p. 214.   Christine Lahti recently reported that playing a Holocaust-era Jewish gynecologist provoked 
panic attacks, insomnia, and experiences of anxiety she had not had before.  She recounted that it was difficult to 
move beyond her character’s experiences, that it took “several months to recover,” and found “when I got back 
to my life, I could take nothing for granted ever again.”  Robin Pogrebin, “A Survivor’s Story: Choosing When 
would.32  Indeed, this effect is part of the motivation for using drama as an educational and 
therapeutic tool.33
This line of argument is open to an obvious objection, a version of the one levied against 
the mistaken message rationale for the unconstitutionality of compelled speech.  Since the 
There are No Choices,” New York Times, April 13, 2003, p. 12.  One of the more striking claimed examples of 
this effect is that of Ronald Reagan.  Michael Paul Rogin argues in Ronald Reagan: The Movie, that Ronald 
Reagan was unable to disentangle his real life from his cinematic roles and that this confusion infected his 
Presidency.  Michael Paul Rogin, "Ronald Reagan," The Movie and Other Episodes in Political Demonology, 
(UC Press, 1987).   W. Somerset Maugham explores the phenomenon in his novel Theatre (1937).  Julia, the 
protagonist, finds herself reciting lines from her plays at crucial moments in her personal life, unaware as she is 
doing it that they are not her own words.  George Cukor’s “A Double Life” tracks, albeit over-dramatically and 
fairly implausibly, the descent into jealous insanity of an actor playing Othello who cannot distinguish between 
the play and his own life.
The phenomenon is not, I think, belied by the Method-influenced idea that good actors draw from their own 
experiences or even re-enact prior emotional episodes.  For while an actor’s  insight into and presentation of a 
character may be driven by her own direct experience, the composition of the character’s traits -- the character’s 
attitudes, judgments, habits, behaviors-- that the actor inhabits may be quite different from the actor’s own.  
Taking on a role may push one towards a pattern of thoughts and behaviors that, while accessible from the 
actor’s personal experience, would not be the actor’s own but for the practice of playing the role.  
Not all actors experience significant leakage between their characters and their outside lives.  One actor I 
interviewed (KK) did not believe he was directly influenced by his roles in this way.  Although he reported that 
playing troubled characters helped him to understand certain sorts of people and their actions better; in 
conversation, he connected this deeper understanding to a change in some of his political views and, in 
particular, to coming to an opposition to the death penalty.  Some doubts about the spill-over effect of acting onto 
the actor’s personal life are expressed in Charles Neuringer & Ronald A. Willis, “The Cognitive Psychodynamics 
of acting: Character invasion and director influence,” Empirical Studies in the Arts, 1995, 13:1, 47-53.  Their 
study, however, was based on a fairly short period of time and a relatively small sample, assessing student actors’ 
responses over only the rehearsal process and a short run of performances.  It did not attempt to assess whether 
the role had an influence on the actor after the show’s run or whether longer runs would make a difference.
32
  In one interview I did with an young Method Actor, he reported that it typically took him a week to 
recover fully from taking on a character for an audition; that roles he had played influenced his behavior toward 
his brother and his girlfriend; that he responded emotionally to a commercial he saw as a character he recently 
played would have; and that playing an emotionally disturbed man influenced how he later viewed and 
responded to a friend’s emotional problems (interview with Santiago Ponce, 2/12/03).
Obviously, this is a complex phenomenon that is difficult to interpret with confidence or clarity.  It is worth 
nothing three important contrasts between the insincere speech of acting and that of compelled speech.  First, by 
contrast with compelled speech, actors intentionally try to identify with – even immerse themselves in - their 
roles and what their characters say, at least while they are performing, to deliver a convincing performance.  But, 
second, while the immersion may be greater, it is, in part, achieved as a deliberate end.  There is a high level of 
awareness and deliberate framing of the process; it is fairly transparent (and voluntary).  Third, the performance 
is valued by the actor and others as a performance; it is a special event of non-authentic expression that is not a 
quotidian element of the actor’s life. This may make its status as a performance more salient to the actor than to 
the compelled speaker.  The compulsory nature of the speech may possibly recede into the background of the 
agent’s awareness because it is not essential to its performance that it be a performance; quite the contrary, those 
who compel the speech typically aim for the compelled speech to come to be sincere or at least for its 
compulsory nature not to be salient to the agent.  Whereas, the ‘pretend’ nature of the actor’s activities is 
persistently salient; the point of what the actor is doing is that it is a performance.  These last two contrasts may 
be relevant to how much direct, non-deliberative influence the performed speech has on the actor’s thoughts and 
how much easier it may be for the actor, as a person, to maintain distance from the insincere speech. 
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 See e.g., Mallika Henry, “Drama’s Ways of Learning,” Research in Drama Education; Abingdon; Mar 
2000 vol 5, issue 1 45-62.
speaker (as well as her audience) knows that the speech is compelled, won’t this knowledge 
have an impact on how great the influence is of what she says on what she thinks?  Isn’t it 
less likely that these spoken words will become a source of intuitive reliance in other cases?  
Won’t these sentiments be segregated in the speaker’s mind as having a compelled, special 
origin?  
The brief reply to this objection is that speakers have an interest in avoiding an analog to 
cognitive dissonance.  A moral agent has an interest in avoiding what I will call performative 
dissonance: states of conflict or tension between one says or appears to say and what one 
thinks.  This interest provides some subtle internal pressure to conform one’s thoughts to 
one’s utterances and vice versa.  Where the utterances cannot be altered, because they are 
compelled, the impulse to avoid performative dissonance may exert subtle, perhaps 
unconscious, pressure to alter one’s thoughts to conform to the content of one’s utterances.34
34
  Some results in cognitive psychological research may lend support. See e.g. Robert Levenson, Ekman and 
Wallace Friesen, Voluntary Facial Action Generates Emotion-Specific Autonomic Nervous System Activity, 27 
Psychophysiology 363, 364, 368, 376, 382 (1990) (exercises directing actors and non-actors to configure their 
faces as though they were experiencing emotion as well as those directing subjects to relive a past emotional 
experience significantly influenced subjects’ current mental and emotional states); Paul Ekman and Richard 
Davidson, Voluntary Smiling Changes Regional Brain Activity, 4 Psychological Science 342, 345 (1993) 
(distinguishing between the presentation of voluntary and involuntary smiles but finding that deliberately 
produced smiles generate some of the brain activity associated with positive emotions); Robin Damrad-Frye and 
James D. Laird, The Experience of Boredom: The Role of Self-Perception of Attention, 57 J. Personality and 
Social Psychology 315, 315 (July-Dec. 1989) (reporting ‘much research’ that ‘people induced to act as though 
they held particular emotions, attitudes, motives or beliefs’ report later having these mental states). The studies 
tend to confirm the view that actions can influence feelings and beliefs, not just reflect them. Some of these 
studies conflate more behaviorist views (that the relevant mental states are identical to a set of activities) and 
epistemological views (that one’s mental states are known by observing one’s behavior) with the causal thesis we 
are interested in (that the relevant mental states may be caused by and not only causes of the relevant activities). 
See e.g. Laird at 315. One might believe the causal thesis without agreeing about its underlying mechanism and 
without subscribing to one of the tenets of self-perception theory: that agents infer their mental states from their 
activities and these inferences either constitute their mental states or cause these mental states to happen. 
 Barbara Fried asks whether and why this phenomenon would be more exaggerated when a person is 
compelled to voice a claim rather than to listen to it.  While I am not qualified to make confident empirical 
assertions, the evidence cited above as well as some of the literature on the contributions of rote learning suggest 
that the influence on a person of some propositions she herself voices is stronger than those she merely hears.  
The argument below about sincerity may provide a partial explanation of the phenomenon.  One's own 
statements are typically associated with oneself and are typically associated with moral norms of sincerity; 
consequently, connections of identity and pressures of sincerity may be activated.  By contrast, when one listens, 
there is an intrinsic separation between oneself and what is communicated.
The argument I am gesturing at may be clarified by introducing a related, additional 
argument against compelled speech, namely that compelled speech regulations represent 
either objectionable indifference or hostility towards character virtues that are reasonably 
precious to citizens, both as individuals and as First Amendment actors.  Of course, the 
argument just rehearsed also submits to this characterization.  The surreptitious influence that 
rote recitations may have over time upon one’s thoughts pose a threat to one’s independent 
and critical deliberative thought processes.  Given its First Amendment commitments, the 
state cannot act in a way that conflicts with, and may undermine, its citizens’ capacities and 
exercise of independent judgment.  Compelled speech requirements of the sort at issue in 
Barnette and Wooley show disrespect towards, and may even threaten, other character virtues 
that are integrally related to the well-functioning of a robust First Amendment culture.
In particular, compelled speech requirements conflict with recognition of and respect for 
the value of sincerity.  Compelled utterances like the pledge of allegiance force some people 
to attest to things they do not believe.  Such attestations at least have the form of an insincere 
utterance and perhaps have the form of a lie.  In the case of the pledge, they are compelled to 
pledge to something that they may not believe is worth pledging to, or which they may 
believe is unworthy of or an inappropriate object for such commitment.   
One may respond that the pledge isn’t really taken seriously as a pledge by the speaker, 
since it is compelled, and that, likewise, the attestation is not taken seriously as an attestation 
since it is compelled.  Perhaps the audience’s knowledge of the conditions of utterance (and 
the speaker’s knowledge of the audience’s awareness) is sufficient to make it the case that 
these are not really full-fledged attestations or pledges so that the state is not, technically, 
compelling some of its citizens to lie.   But, I suspect that this maneuver posits too much 
flexibility on the part of the speaker toward her own speech-acts and that further, it would be 
reasonable for speakers to resist developing such flexibility.  Such compartmentalization may 
be difficult to achieve.35 One may reasonably object to having to stand in a relation of distrust 
to oneself, to having to engage in self-vigilance, so as to avoid having the state use one’s own 
activities as a mode of access into one’s thoughts.
Compartmentalization may also be especially costly with respect to serious utterances.  
That is, there may be certain sorts of utterances that have special gravity or significance to 
speakers: e.g. oaths, promises, and perhaps even attestations.  Their significance to speakers 
and audiences may be reduced if these utterances are issued insincerely or if usage becomes 
such that their linguistic context does not unequivocally convey the speaker’s (contextual) 
meaning.  It may be important to religious people, for example, not to ‘take the Lord’s name 
in vain,’ even if a swearing utterance is understood by the speaker and the audience not to be 
serious.36  Some sorts of significant performances may be cheapened if people engage in 
them insincerely or pretend at them.  Those who take some practices, like promising or 
giving an oath, to be linguistically ideal, may have special reason for adopting a protective 
stance toward certain utterances, reserving them only for certain uses.  To regard a practice as 
linguistically ideal is to regard it as a convention begun and maintained by designating 
certain linguistic performances as making possible certain activities: on some views of 
promising, we create the institution of promising and create a set of speech acts that make it 
35
  Actors often deploy techniques to achieve or to reinforce the distance between their roles and themselves.  
This may require exercises and degrees of self-consciousness that it is reasonable for the everyday citizen to 
object to having to engage in to maintain control over her mind.    See Neuringer and Wills, p. 49 (citing 
unpublished dissertation by D.K. Collum “The Empathic Ability of Actors: A Behavioral Study,” 1976)).  In an 
interview, one actor (KK) reported that to distance himself from a role, he would sometimes need to engage in 
extremely vigorous exercise; reporting his observation of others, he also connected actors’ use of alcohol as well 
as binge eating to efforts to overcome the influence of a character and to return to oneself.
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  Analogously, there may be some practices it is important not to pretend to engage in.   Some parents 
object to their children playing with toy guns because they think it may be important to our resistance to killing 
not to pretend to kill. Although, as I discussed in the text, some Jewish counsels advise practicing the ritual 
before belief, other religious traditions look askance at pretending to pray, even when the pretense is not intended 
to deceive.   In an editorial written just after the inclusion of “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, an actively 
religious, Christian school teacher voiced his general objections to public pressure to attest to religious belief.  
Arguing that “the only respectable reason for professing a religion is the conviction that it is true…,” he 
expressed concern that efforts to inculcate religious practice or belief through “non-religious pressures”  dilute or 
otherwise have a corrupting influence on religion and religious belief.  Hoxie N. Fairchild, “Religious Faith and 
Loyalty,” The New Republic, (October 11, 1954), 11-13 at 12.
possible for us to bind ourselves through speech, e.g. we deem it possible to bind ourselves 
by declaring “I promise.”  The maintenance of linguistically ideal practices, that is, 
maintaining a practice by which it becomes possible to bind oneself in this way just by 
uttering certain phrases, may depend upon the phrases’ use being regularly sincere and 
restricted to sincere use. To use and preserve the practice’s special social significance, 
speakers may have to restrain their uses of it and treat its terms as though they have special 
significance.  But this attitude need not be restricted to those who believe certain phrases or 
terms make possible practices that would otherwise be impossible.  One may believe 
commitment is possible without special phrases like “I promise” or “I swear” while 
nonetheless thinking that it is important to showing respect for the practice and its value that 
one restrict one’s use of phrases that invoke the practice to sincere utterances.   There is 
something special about ‘giving one’s word’; taking that seriously requires that one should 
not make a practice of joking around about it or attesting insincerely.37
Thus, compelled speech requirements may also be criticized on the grounds that they are 
indifferent to citizens’ actual beliefs and so may ask citizens to represent themselves through 
speech insincerely.  But, sincerity is crucial to preserving the meaning of important speech 
and other social practices. The virtue of sincerity is also crucially bound up with the power of 
the justification for First Amendment protections.  While free speech protections in any 
particular case do not turn upon whether the speaker is actually sincere, many different 
values of the First Amendment depend upon or are enhanced by sincerity on the part of 
individual citizens. If some part of the value of the First Amendment rests upon our joint 
interest in approaching and appreciating the truth, this effort is vastly facilitated by speakers 
giving voice to what they actually believe has merit (or may have merit, or is at least worth 
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 In Blasi and Shiffrin, supra note 27 at 458, we also develop a related concern about compelled speech, 
namely that compelling insincere attestations to promote government purposes treats citizens and their speech 
capacities in objectionably instrumental ways.
grappling with). An ethic of sincere belief in the truth of one’s professions helps to focus the 
collective attention of the populace on the ideas that hold the most promise of meeting 
various human needs, whether practical or intellectual.  An ethic of sincere professions of 
belief also focuses citizens’ interest and attention on truth, whereas state measures that flaunt 
an indifference to sincerity encourage cynicism and ambivalence about the value of truth.  
The same may be said even more forcefully of the importance of freedom of speech in 
promoting the ideal of mutual understanding among citizens who appreciate each others’ 
needs and concerns and who strive to forge political accommodations on the basis of this 
appreciation. Genuine understanding and accommodation depends upon citizens’ voicing 
their needs sincerely and abstaining, so far as possible, from grandstanding, manipulation, 
and other forms of cynical gamesmanship. 
Of course, as Meir Dan-Cohen has explored in depth, there are contexts in which 
sincerity is not expected from a speaker such as when a telephone operator thanks us for our 
business or wishes us a good day.38  This need not be disputed.  Utterances qua citizen, unlike 
those of a telephone operator or a student of a language, do not take place in a context in 
which insincerity is reasonably expected and transparently associated with a role with which 
one is not supposed to identify. There is no well-defined role with clear, discrete boundaries 
comparable to the employee or to the language learner that the pledge reciter is to occupy that 
justifies indifference to sincerity. The state’s defense of its practice cannot rely on the idea 
that it is reasonable to expect disassociation on the part of the citizen from the role of the 
citizen.
So, to summarize, one objection to substantive recitation requirements is that, at best, 
they manifest indifference to a character virtue that should be encouraged and supported if 
the values of the First Amendment are to be well realized. A related, perhaps more important, 
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 Meir Dan-Cohen, Harmful Thoughts (2002).  
concern is that a recitation requirement places the citizen who strives to be sincere but who 
does not believe the contents of the recitation either to disobey the law or compromise the 
character virtue. In effect, the requirement places citizens in a dilemma, pitting two duties of 
good citizenship (and good character) against one another.  Citizens who read the pledge to 
assert that the nation is in fact providing liberty and justice for all but who doubt that this 
claim is true must fail to satisfy either the duty of obedience or the duty of sincerity, the 
cultivation of which are both essential to the functioning of a free republic. 
The Barnette protection, then, is best understood if one attends not to the audience of the 
compelled speaker but to the effect of compulsion on the character and mental contents of the 
compelled party.  Turning our attention inward onto the association rather than (exclusively) 
outward onto its audience also, I believe, provides a stronger defense of protections against 
compelled association.  But to see this requires some consideration of the value of 
association, and the shortcomings of Justice Brennan’s dichotomy between intimate, 
intrinsically valuable associations and expressive, instrumentally valuable associations.
C. The Value of Association
What lurks behind the model of freedom of association in Jaycees and Dale is what I call 
the amplification device conception of freedom of association.  On this conception, 
associations are valuable from a freedom of speech perspective because they serve to amplify 
the messages individuals seek to express.  By banding together, individual speakers can be 
louder, thereby more effective in dispersing their message and able to convey more 
accurately the intensity and depth with which its content is adhered to by a range of members 
of the public.39
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 Roderick Hills independently coined a similar label, labeling this approach the 'megaphone' conception.  
See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., 78 NYU LR 144, xxx (2003).
The idea that associations provide effective instrumental means for like-minded 
individuals to join together, broadcast their views and exert stronger, safer modes of 
influence is well expressed in N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne.40  Drawing together a group of 
precedents, the court remarked: “The practice of persons sharing common views banding 
together to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American political process. 
…By collective effort individuals can make their views known, when, individually, their 
voices would be faint or lost."  It located the importance of freedom of association in 
guaranteeing the right of people to make their voices heard on public issues, reiterating 
Justice Harlan’s dictum that… “effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, 
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court 
has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of 
speech and assembly."41
This understanding of the value of association makes association a tool for expression.  It 
lends itself, naturally, to an approach to freedom of association that focuses on whether the 
message or outward expression of the members becomes distorted by a regulation.  But while 
this surely is among the values of association, it is an incomplete picture.  On this 
understanding, associations channel disparate individuals who independently share a point of 
view into a louder, more concentrated output stream.  A regulation is problematic if the effect 
is to distort the output so that it no longer closely resembles the model of what the input is 
supposed to look like.  This view of associations, and of what the problem of their regulation 
may be drastically undervalues their relationship to freedom of speech values.  Associations, 
I will argue, are not merely instrumental broadcasting tools to make expression more 
effective.  An important function of private associations is that they operate as sites in which 
40 459 U.S. 858 (1982).
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the thoughts and ideas of members are formed, in which the content of expression and speech 
is generated, not merely compacted and exported.  That is, associations are important from a 
freedom of speech perspective because of what happens inside of them, not solely or even 
necessarily in light of their relationships to the outside world.  Investigations into the 
constitutionality of regulations of association must be more sensitive to its value and integral 
connection to freedom of speech.
Nor is the picture fully complemented by observing that association membership may 
have intrinsic value--that larger organizations may, in part, instantiate some of the social 
values standardly associated with smaller intimate associations like the family.42 Participation 
in them provides companionship, a sense of belonging, connection to others, social support 
and may cultivate interest in politics and social problems outside of the self.  This is true as 
well but there is another core aspect of associations connected to free expression that I aim to 
uncover.  Instead of stressing exclusively the effectiveness of associations in broadcasting 
outwards, the most important connection between association and speech is an internal and 
creative one: associations and social connections are places where ideas are formed, shared, 
developed, and come to influence character.  Ongoing, congenial interaction with others 
fosters mutual interests, common agendas, and a revisiting of notions.  Ideas are tested, 
developed and accepted within social settings.  The views one comes to have and to consider 
are heavily influenced by who we interact with and especially who we trust.  If we think of 
associations as sites where ideas are developed and take root (instead of just relying on 
models of export), then just as with Barnette the danger of compelled association is not 
simply message distortion but something more akin to mind control.
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There are two, interconnected ways to make out this connection between associations and 
freedom of speech.  The more obvious way is to substantiate the sociological claim that 
people’s ideas and beliefs are influenced by their social relationships.43  The other way is to 
argue that normatively it is what we would expect and want from citizens within liberalism.  
What follows is a sketch of an argument that emphasizes the latter strand.44
As I intimated earlier, Brennan’s dichotomy between intrinsically and instrumentally 
valuable associations and his mapping of expressive associations onto the category of 
instrumentally valuable associations are too simple.  Expressive associations and membership 
therein also have intrinsic value.  In saying this, I do not mean merely to acknowledge that 
sustained and structured forms of social interaction can be central elements of individual 
well-being, although this is true and already poses a difficulty for Brennan’s dichotomy.  I 
mean further to assert that expressive associations bear a more intimate relationship to the 
values of freedom of speech than the instrumental picture contained within Brennan’s 
analysis.  
43 Apart from its intuitiveness, there is substantial evidence for such a claim.  For a few general discussions, 
see Randall Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change, passim 
(1998), Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point (2000), and Eviatar Zerubavel, Social Mindscapes (1997).  
Two more focused and in-depth treatments of anecdotal phenomena appear in Louis Menand, The 
Metaphysical Club (2001) and Jenny Uglow, Lunar Men (2002).  See also discussions about group think 
and other forms of group dynamics in Cass Sunstein, cite, et alia. "Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go 
To Extremes," 110 Yale Law Journal 71 (2000).
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In brief, the argument I plan to make is this.  Although liberalism is often criticized for 
being overly individualistic and insufficiently attentive to intermediate associations,45 such 
criticisms depend on shallow articulations of liberal theory.  To the contrary, the strongest 
forms of liberalism start from premises that emphasize the significance and value of social 
relationships and social cooperation.46  To the extent that liberalism is a distinctive theory, 
distinguishable from libertarianism, liberalism is essentially a theory about the value of 
cooperative activity and the proper role social cooperation plays in shaping the identities and 
opportunities of autonomous individuals who engage in it.47  The role social cooperation 
plays in liberal theory is absolutely central.  It is the starting place of the theory and of its 
conception of the person.   Social cooperation provides opportunities for individuals to 
develop autonomous capacities, some of which involve capacities concerning interpersonal 
interaction, and creates sophisticated and unique contexts for its full exercise that would 
otherwise be impossible.  In this way, liberal theories differ dramatically from libertarian 
theories: libertarian theories begin with the individual and struggle to justify and explain the 
conditions under which social cooperation might be acceptable to autonomous individuals, 
where the conditions and value of their autonomy are thought to be more prior to and in some 
tension with the compromises of social cooperation.  For liberals, social cooperation is an 
integral context in which the autonomy of individuals is formed and may achieve its full 
exercise and value.  
45 See e.g. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, and Michael Sandel xxx. 
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Brennan’s theory implicitly resembles more of a libertarian theory of association than a 
liberal theory of association.  A liberal theory should take more seriously that associations 
have formative effects on their members and that they are not merely conglomerations of 
people who have stable identities and pre-formed positions.
Social interactions, like one’s activities, may have an inchoate influence on one’s 
thought.  This is not merely a product of familiarity and the tendency to assimilate and 
integrate that which is close.  It is also a product of admirable qualities that serve our moral 
ends.  Social cooperation involves not merely efficient divisions of labor but also relations of 
trust, reciprocity, mutual engagement, mutual interest and mutual enjoyment of each others’ 
company.  And the trust we engage in does not amount solely to beliefs that people will keep 
their commitments and refrain from doing one another harm.  It also involves epistemic 
relationships in which we often take others’ assertions as true; in other cases, we take them to 
be likely to be true or at least worth considering.  The concerns and beliefs of our fellow 
cooperators occupy some prominence on our mental agenda.  Such epistemic relationships 
form partly because they are essential for pursuing complex projects of material labor as well 
as of intellectual production that would not be possible were we to regard ourselves as 
responsible for independently initiating every thought and for verifying every claim.48
They also form as a valuable and natural aspect of the relationships of mutual 
interdependence and engagement.  These relationships are instrumentally useful but their 
significance in people’s lives goes far beyond that.  These relationships of cooperation and 
mutual dependence involve high levels of emotional engagement and emotional and cultural 
definition.  People whose lives are inter-twined are reasonably and understandably be 
influenced by one another’s thoughts and ideas.  They will both consciously and 
48
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unconsciously take an interest in what their peers are interested in.  They may try to 
understand one another, to come to consensus where possible, and to organize their interests 
around one another.  Mature moral agents engaged in practices of engagement and 
cooperation become sensitive to one another, have attitudes of charity toward one another 
and aim toward certain forms of harmony and cooperation with one another.   Sustained 
interaction with one another will influence their thoughts.  Their mental lives will be 
structured substantially through processes of absorbing and reacting to the ideas and beliefs 
of their companions, as well as their actions.  These processes of absorption and reaction are 
built upon and refined to produce different ideas and views than would be produced by 
solitary individuals or ones who interact but do not build relationships of cooperation and 
interdependence.  That is, the suggestion is that in liberal societies, sites of association are 
sites in which ideas are exchanged and built upon; that individuals’ mental lives are strongly 
influenced by these interactions; and that ideas and expressions are the joint product of these 
forms of association.  On this picture, then, associations are not merely devices for more 
efficient broadcasting of ideas and views that like-minded individuals have independently but 
coincidently formed.  Nor is the more sophisticated view that they are sites for the mutual 
pursuit of shared aims a full characterization of the general value of association.49  Though 
such a view correctly turns attention away from the perception of and communication with 
outsiders, it still draws on the idea that associations must involve individuals who band 
together to pursue independently and antecedently formed beliefs and aims and that it is 
essential that the members share ideas and beliefs. Both of these pictures neglect what I 
believe to be the core feature of associations that essentially connects freedom of association 
with freedom of speech: associations may be and often serve as sites of idea formation in 
49
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which views develop, steep, grow upon each other and come to influence their members, 
whether or not they begin with shared ideas or emerge with them.
*         *        *
Thus far, I have claimed that: liberalism champions social interaction and coordination 
and that it regards autonomy as realizable and most fully realized within such systems, not as 
opposed to it; that social cooperation involves forms of conscious and unconscious epistemic 
cooperation and mutual influence, both as a means of pursuing more complex material and 
intellectual joint endeavors but also as a byproduct of character virtues associated with social 
cooperation.
To connect this to issues of freedom of association and compelled association involves 
two further but fairly predictable steps.  First, social associations merit strong forms of 
protection within a liberal society both because of the non-speech-related benefits of close 
and regular social connections to other community members and to protect First Amendment 
interests.  Social associations bear a special relationship to speech values partly in light of 
their instrumental properties and because the connection between cooperation and idea-
production is more pronounced in associations since they  involve continuous and regular 
interactions by individuals who come to exert influence upon one another.
Second, given the sorts of influence closely interacting people have on one another, 
members of social associations have important freedom of speech interests in having very 
strong control over the membership of such associations.  One set of reasons would be 
success-oriented.  We would expect these processes to work more readily in contexts where 
members feel comfortable with one another and feel as though they can readily trust one 
another.  If they regard social associations as important places in which ideas are developed, 
circulated and tested, they may have speech-related interests in ensuring that the associations 
function well.  
The other set of reasons is more protective in nature. Given the character virtues activated 
and inculcated by social cooperation and the openness to influence of one’s beliefs and 
mental agenda by others with whom one interacts in relations of trust, we might expect 
individuals to regard it as fairly important to be able to be selective about those they interact 
with, especially in contexts in which the interactions and conversations may be or are meant 
to be relaxed and unfocused.   If they feel they will be influenced by those they have close 
interactions with, that their character traits and virtues render them open to such influence, 
they may reasonably want to protect themselves against being influenced, in ways they may 
not be able to predict or articulate, by those they do not trust or do not feel kinship with.    
While Brennan’s imagined horror of compelled association was message disruption, on this 
picture, as with the recasting of the disvalue of compelled speech, the complementary and 
perhaps more salient horror sounds in concerns of mind control and the ability to exercise 
freely character virtues that play a central role in human flourishing but also in a healthy free 
speech culture.
I do not mean to suggest that one must affirmatively trust specific people, whether 
consciously or not, in order to have some reason to believe what they say.  Nor, on the other 
hand, do I mean to claim that all relations of trust contribute directly and immediately, all-
things-considered, to the discovery or appreciation of truth.  Nor am I claiming that 
prescriptively, one should be influenced only by those that one happens to trust; one may, of 
course, trust unreliable or wrongheaded people.
What I mean to claim is as follows:   Individuals may well have pro tanto warrants to 
accept others' seemingly sincere assertions as a default matter.  Nonetheless, relations of trust 
can reasonably and often do, empirically, encourage or enhance both the level of engagement 
with others' claims and ideas as well as the level of acceptance of them.  The higher degree of 
acceptance of claims can be justified by epistemic reasons and explained by normative 
pressures. Epistemically, trust and specific beliefs about others' expertise and reliability may 
supply reasons that overcome reasons to doubt.  Normatively, there are often reasons to try to 
find consensus and common ground with those with whom one shares activities and space.  
Whether or not such reasons supply justifications for greater rates of acceptance of others' 
claims, they certainly provide justification for higher levels of engagement with others' 
claims.  One, often, should at least attend to the beliefs of those with whom one has 
interactions and relationships, even if only to evaluate them critically.
These interactive effects, I claim, enrich – in essential ways –the intellectual climate in 
which the First Amendment operates and has meaning.  Ideas and schools of ideas gain 
greater development and refinement than they would in isolation while others are mooted and 
more closely evaluated within a climate of sympathy; the dissent and criticism they generate 
may be more effective because of the congenial milieu in which it operates.50  Of course, 
some trusted people will be unworthy and many of the views fostered and developed will be 
false and even pernicious.  
The two speech concerns complement one another.  One might object to the protective 
rationales both against compelled speech and compelled association that individuals should 
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exercise techniques of self-protection.  They should be vigilant in ensuring that they do not 
entertain or come to believe views just because they have mouthed them or because they 
have been in relations of propinquity and dependence with people who may not be worthy of 
trust.   But, whether or not it is realistic to expect people to police their belief formation that 
strictly and comprehensively, it is not clear that it is normatively desirable to place such a 
burden on individuals in settings whose function is to promote social interaction and idea 
formation.   Such vigilance requires enacting barriers of resistance, remove, and chary trust.   
Such stances interfere with the achievement of the organization’s function.
A different way to put this point is this. Meir Dan-Cohen has fruitfully distinguished 
between nondetached and detached roles. 51 In detached roles, one can perform the 
obligations of the role successfully without identifying with the obligations and even without 
performing them sincerely; not so with nondetached roles.  The A.T.& T. operator can 
successfully perform her obligations by thanking you for using A.T.&T. without actually 
being grateful and we might add that she has not acted poorly by expressing gratitude 
insincerely.  Not so of the parent who thanks the stranger for helping his child.  The parent 
will not have performed his filial duty well if his thanks are insincere and we should think the 
worse of him if they are.  In my view, the proper analysis of the value of freedom of speech 
does not take the A.T. &T. operator as the paradigm case around which to build a theory.   A 
constitutional regime’s approach to compelled speech and to compelled associations should 
not depend too heavily for its justification on the expectation that its citizens maintain 
detachment from what they are made to say or from their associates. 
Our approach should recognize the existence of some sorts of associations that are not 
organizations in Dan-Cohen’s sense, ones in which we expect people to be open and 
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responsive with one another, to not be especially on their guard.  I want to insist both that 
expectations of non-detachment are more realistic than expectations of thorough-going 
detachment -- that people interacting with one another socially and regularly seek and tend 
towards nondetachment amongst each other – and that expectations of widespread 
detachment are normatively unappealing.  It is preferable to create sites in which people can 
identify with what they say and who they are surrounded by; the existence of such sites is 
connected to generating character virtues of sincerity, earnestness, and mutual trust.
D. The Right of Freedom of Association and Its Conditions
1. The positive right
The foregoing arguments articulating a core value of freedom of association and its 
intimate connection to freedom of speech have implications for the form the corresponding 
right should take.  The right of association, if it is to protect the interests that underwrite it, 
suggest a corresponding right to exclude unwanted members.  The right to exclude should be 
fairly absolute.  To invoke it, members of an association need not have to show that they 
have a clear message they are attempting to communicate to others or to themselves.  Nor 
need an association articulate a clear common purpose in order to enjoy the freedom to 
exclude. Neither articulateness, decisiveness, nor coherence should be preconditions for 
successful assertion of free speech rights.  Freedom of speech must also protect the process 
by which ideas and expressions are generated, nurtured, and mooted both in individuals and 
in groups.  Any plausible theory of the development and evaluation of ideas should recognize 
that, especially where the process takes place in a social setting, the process may involve 
dispute, dissension, and unclarity, that these stages may be temporary or perhaps ongoing, 
and that these features are not necessarily a sign of failure.  Dispute or dissension within a 
group of people who are comfortable with one another and willing to associate may be a 
productive catalyst in the formation and understanding of the beliefs of individual members.   
Nonetheless, the members of the group should have the ability to determine the conditions on 
which they interact and the people with whom they share and recognize the relations of 
identification and trust that underlie these processes of social influence, whether the chosen 
relationships are harmonious, articulate and focused or shaggy, disorganized, and 
contentious.
On this analysis, then, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hurley v. Irish American Gay, 
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston52 makes perfect sense, whether one understands it as a 
compelled speech case or a compelled association case.  In Hurley, the Supreme Court 
recognized a First Amendment right on the part of the organizers of the Irish American 
parade to exclude a group who wished to march in the parade under a banner identifying 
themselves as the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.  From the 
perspective of the test articulated in Jaycees, the decision seemed arbitrary because the 
parade organizers were not attempting to convey any particular message and had not 
exercised any other sort of selectiveness about whom to include or exclude.   This has led 
some to frame the Hurley decision as one that turns on the special features of public forms of 
expression, like parades or protests, and the special delicacy of government regulation of 
such public forms of expression.  I do not wish to deny that distinction, but on the account I 
am articulating, it need not be depended upon.  Hurley might instead be understood as 
affirming that where the freedom of association right adheres, its possessors need not have a 
coherent set of reasons relating to a coherent message or purpose that they can articulate for 
why they will or will not exclude certain parties.  Instead, we should recognize that robust 
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freedom of speech requires comfortable spaces in which individuals enjoy free conditions in 
which they contemplate and form ideas; that this space should not be construed in an entirely 
individualistic way but we should recognize that thought production and idea affirmation 
happens productively in social contexts; and so, there should be some arenas of social 
congregation in which members of groups have the power to decide what forms of human 
influence they will be open to and willing to interact with in contexts of mutual trust and 
voluntary association.  To affirm such a right is not to endorse the decision of the organizers 
of the Irish American parade.  Their decision was wrong and bigoted.  But the freedom of 
speech right does, as I believe it does, encompass a right to resist certain forms of mental 
interference and mind control and to make up one’s own mind, even if the exercise of that 
right will lead a person to ignore important information and to emerge with incorrect 
judgments.   What I have argued here, is that the right to participate in certain processes of 
idea formation free from social control encompasses not only the individual’s mind, 
considered in isolation, but also some social processes and sites of idea formation that may be 
as crucial as solitary contemplation.
2. The limited scope of a nearly absolute right to exclude
The recognition of a nearly absolute right of social associations to exclude unwanted 
members does not entail that Roberts v. Jaycees was incorrectly decided, only that Justice 
Brennan’s opinion was misguided.  By contrast, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence was largely 
correct.  It drew an important distinction may be drawn between associations that operate as 
social associations and those organizations that operate as business associations or as parts of 
the competitive economy.  The strong freedom of association right for which I have 
advocated only directly applies to the former.53  In this section, I will defend the theoretical 
relevance of such a distinction, but I will not attempt to perfect any test that would serve as a 
criterion for delineation.
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Jaycees persuasively argued that the impact of forced 
association on the message of the Jaycees was not the relevant issue and that the standard 
articulated by Justice Brennan would be both overbroad and underinclusive.  Such a standard 
might potentially provide protection for the discrimination of commercial enterprises that 
engaged in some expressive activities but might provide insufficient protection for the power 
of an expressive association to create and define a “voice.”54  While she acknowledged that it 
is difficult to draw a clear line between expressive and commercial associations, she argued 
that the constitutionality of statutes regulating association membership should turn on this 
line.  
“An association must choose its market.  Once it enters the marketplace of commerce in
any substantial degree it loses the complete control over its membership that it would 
otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.”55
Justice O’Connor’s articulation of the first amendment problem with compelled 
association was uncomfortably close to spirit of Justice Brennan’s.  She emphasized a 
concern with whether regulation of membership would “necessarily affect, change, dilute or 
silence one collective voice that would otherwise be heard.”56  I have already registered the 
objections that might be made to this narrow construal of the disvalue of regulation of social 
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or expressive associations and argued that the First Amendment function of these 
associations should be more broadly construed.  But, I do not think these criticisms 
undermine the force of the general point she was making, namely that commercial 
associations may be legitimately treated differently, even if they have a message, the force or 
clarity of which might be diluted or distorted by regulations of their membership.    
Why may they be treated differently? 
Regulation to promote inclusive membership practices is justified when applied to 
associations whose primary purpose is participation in the commercial milieu because of the 
central importance of fair access to material resources and mechanisms of power.  Further, 
because such associations operate within a highly competitive marketplace and have a fairly 
focused purpose whose pursuit is largely guided by its context of operation, these 
associations do not function in a context that is likely to be conducive to the free, sincere, 
uninhibited, and undirected consideration of ideas and ways of life.57  Regulations requiring 
inclusive membership and employment practices, then, pose less of a threat to the aim of 
facilitating free and open sites of interaction and explicit and implicit communication.  This 
is not to say that integration in the workplace does not have a profound effect on the culture 
and the attitudes of workers.  There is no question that it may, in primarily positive ways.58
My point is not that workplace interaction cannot be formative in significant ways but rather 
that because the workplace activities are singularly focused and already significantly 
regulated and limited by the requirements of marketplace activity, the infringement on 
freedom of association interests is not especially significant.  These associations are not 
structured in such a way to function as sites of freedom of speech and further, there are 
57
 Compare C. Edward Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1992).
58
 See my “Race, Labor, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle,” Fordham Law Review 2004 and 
Cynthia Estlund, Working Together (2003).
voluntary associations available to individuals in which they may congregate, with those they 
choose, to engage in unstructured, open forms of activity and interaction.
The argument I have just given suggests that principles of equal opportunity have specific 
application where access to resources is at stake and where their method of distribution is 
highly competitive.  But it may be objected that the strong right of exclusion enjoyed by 
voluntary associations entails that significant social and cultural resources may be held out of 
reach for those who are excluded.  In reply, I concede that those excluded from voluntary 
associations such as the Boy Scouts may indeed suffer by not being allowed to participate in 
significant cultural enterprises.  But, the value of cultural creation is achieved just when those 
who create it also endorse it and its conditions of creation.  Forced methods of generating 
culture suffer authenticity problems that undercut its value.  Further,  the excluded have the 
option to generate associations of their own and to create their own sites of culture and 
mutual recognition and trust. Of course, these alternatives may not substitute completely for 
what is sought by those who are subject to exclusion, namely feeling included and recognized 
by particular cultural entities.  But, they do provide opportunities for creating rival sources of 
recognition and social connection on a voluntary and fully authentic basis.  Because the 
milieu of voluntary associations does not operate on as competitive a basis as businesses and 
related commercial associations, the barriers to creating alternatives are not as high.
III. DALE 
I have been arguing that the Jaycees approach to association is excessively outwardly 
focused.  The Jaycees approach assumes that the model of an association's organizational 
purpose and value emanates outward: that it is focused upon communicating with a larger, 
external public and that our concerns about regulations of associations should center around 
how that function is affected by regulations.  As I have suggested, this is an overly narrow 
way of thinking about the value and function of associations and that the  interest in 
associational freedom may have much more (or at least as much) to do with the internal life 
of associations: how members stand to affect one another’s' thoughts and how associational 
membership affects insiders, not outsiders.  But in turning our focus inward, we should not be 
careful not to adopt an analog of the Jaycees approach by articulating the value of 
associational freedom in terms of associations with specified purposes and well-defined 
commonalities between members.59  Rather, we should begin with the idea that associations 
provide welcome sites for the development of ideas, discussions and disputes between 
members in a comfortable, conductive environment that may or may not have clearly 
specified shared beliefs and purposes and that may be susceptible to dynamic change.
These points should come as no surprise if one turns one's attention to the Boy Scouts in 
particular.  The point of the Boy Scouts organization is not to provide a focal point for 
community-spirited young boys to come together and articulate a message to the public at 
large or even to potential members.  It is an institution designed to influence and to teach 
young men what to think and how to act. Its attention is directed inwardly, toward its 
members -- its point is to influence their character.60
So, in one sense, the Boy Scouts are prototypical of the points I want to make about 
associations. Their function and point is often internal and concerns the interactions and 
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mutual influence of their members as much or more than their stance or communications or 
influence on outsiders.  
But in two related respects, the Boy Scouts are not prototypical of the sorts of 
associations that associational freedom protects.  First, the Boy Scouts is an association of 
children, not adults.  Second, it is an association of children that is directed and run by adults.  
As I will argue, these two features raise interesting constitutional questions that were not, but 
should have been, prominent in the debate in Dale.
Don't get me wrong: it was not lost on anyone that children populate the Boy Scouts. 
Concerns, and their dismissals, about the influence of gay Scoutmasters on young boys 
lurked overtly and covertly in the briefs and in the opinions.  This is not the issue that I have 
in mind.  The presence of children raises an entirely different issue than the one that occupied 
the fears and hysterics of the Boy Scouts advocates.  I want to claim that the presence of 
children cuts against the Boy Scouts' case because it weakens the freedom of association 
claim.
By and large, it was taken for granted in Dale that the standard test for freedom of 
association claims applied.  The question was whether the New Jersey accommodation law, 
as applied, passed or failed this standard.  But both legally and theoretically, the idea that the 
standard test applied should have raised eyebrows.  Legally, the contours of children’s 
constitutional rights often differ from those of adults and it is strange that the question of the 
standard wasn't squarely faced.  Theoretically, it is not clear that children’s associations have 
the properties that would render them subject to the same protections as adult organizations.
  In the prior section, I assert a fairly absolute right to exclude unwanted members in 
social or expressive association, whether or not such exclusion is necessary to preserve the 
clarity (if there is any) of the association’s transmitted message (if there is one).    But the 
argument, I think, supports such a strong right only for adults.  The right I have described for 
strong control over the composition of associations is an autonomy right of the individual 
members, one integrally connected to their free speech interests (among others).  It relies on 
the idea also that individuals should be able to exert control over who they will interact with 
given that their interactions will either activate their virtues of trust or will require demanding 
forms of resistance that individuals may reasonably object to engaging in; the reasonable 
objection may be, in part, that they may balk at complicating and constraining the free 
expression of their character virtues in social commerce.  But these arguments all presuppose 
that the agent we have in mind has had the relevant experience and exposure to a diversity of 
people as well as the relevant opportunities to develop her autonomous capacities such that 
she may be reasonable thought to be empowered and responsible for the exercise of her 
autonomy.  Children, due to their comparative lack of experience and fledgling forms of 
autonomy, may not have adequate grounds to lay claim to the full rights of freedom of 
association to exclude others for no any or no reason.
If so, then the case for Dale would be more troubled.  We might well claim that 
children’s’ association rights are weaker or differently structured: that the state may 
reasonably judge that children may be required to interact with a wide range of people in 
their social activities and to confront and assess the validity of their and others’ biases toward 
unpopular groups; this may ensure that children have a wide informational base to inform 
their subsequent, adult exercises of autonomy and to ensure that children enjoy equal 
opportunities that might otherwise be denied by other children’s untutored exercise of 
autonomy.
Such a position would be in keeping with much legal doctrine concerning children’s 
constitutional rights.  It is, after all, constitutionally permissible to require children to be 
schooled and to subject them to direct efforts to influence their mental content, even if 
mandatory education of adults would be constitutionally suspect.61   Further, despite the 
insight and insistence of Tinker62 and Barnette that children enjoy constitutional rights and 
First Amendment rights in particular, subsequent cases such as Bethel v. Fraser,63 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,64 Vernonia School District v. Acton,65 and 
Pottawatomie v. Earls,66  make clear that these rights do not take the same shape as those of 
adults.  I do not mean to endorse these cases, but in light of them, it seems strange that the 
freedom of association analysis in Dale proceeded so smoothly using the adult track.  For it 
seems much easier to make the case that students may be made to integrate than it was to 
make the case that children may be constrained from speaking injudiciously or from speaking 
openly on controversial subjects. 
The suggestion that Dale is complicated by the fact that it is a children’s association may 
be subject to two objections, one about Barnette and the other about the proper framework 
with which to think about the Boy Scouts.  The first: Barnette’s example is supposed to 
illuminate my analysis of compelled association but how can I embrace Barnette while 
challenging Dale’s application to children?    Doesn’t the argument for the (original) 
application of the Barnette right against compelled speech falter for the same reasons as I 
allege pose a difficulty for Dale?  
Of course, it is already something of an issue to explain how Barnette sits with the clear 
constitutional power of the state to compel the education of children.  And the subsidiary 
question would be, assuming Barnette can be reconciled with this power, which category the 
regulation of children’s’ associations more clearly resembles.  Briefly, children’s’ compelled 
61 For a critical discussion of mandatory education requirements, see Martin Redish and Kevin Finnerty, “What Did 
You Learn in School Today?  Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox,” 88 Cornell L. 
Rev. 62 (2002). 
62 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 US 503 (1969).
63 478 US 675 (1986) (upholding restrictions on offensive student political speech).
64 484 US 260 (1988) (upholding restrictions on controversial student newspaper article).
65
 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding student drug testing).
66 536 US 822 (2002) (upholding student drug testing).
speech of the type invalidated in Barnette seems distinguishable from mandatory education 
efforts in a number of ways that may be brought out by contrasting compelled speech, such 
as the mandatory pledge, with legitimate educational efforts to teach or persuade students of 
such things as the contents of the pledge, its vision of America and the worthiness of 
allegiance. 
Presenting students with such views differs in three ways from recitation requirements.67
First,  presenting to students information, ideals, visions, reasons and arguments for their 
evaluation, deliberation and assessment manifests a clear division between the proponent of 
the views (the state) and the intended audience (the students). This separation intrinsically 
recognizes the distinctness of the audience in a way that compelled speech requirements do 
not. The latter literally conflate the speaker and the intended audience and mark no explicit 
recognition of the separation between them. Second, educational efforts keyed to persuasion
go further and show more nuanced attention to the beliefs of students.  A teacher who 
employs the pedagogy of persuasion engages with the questions and doubts of her students.  
Such a teacher actively nurtures the evaluative and deliberative capacities of students to help 
them arrive at conclusions that are truly their own. Such interactions show respect for the 
judgments and attitudes of students, in contrast to the indifference manifest in recitation 
requirements. Finally, addressing students as an audience, instead of corralling them into 
speaking, shows respect for the virtues of sincerity and intellectual independence and so is 
consistent with recognition of the underlying character traits of citizens necessary for 
achieving the various purposes served by the freedom of speech. 
The case of regulating children’s associations strikes me as more like mandatory 
education than like compelled recitation, although the analogy is not straightforward.  Unlike 
compelled recitation, regulated association that takes the form of inclusion-oriented 
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regulations does not amount to an effort at mind control with a specified content.  In fact, 
associational interaction may influence mental contents and one’s views but the method of 
affecting the mind has even less specified content than the sort of persuasive educations 
efforts just defended.  While the influence may transmit slowly and non-transparently and so 
work somewhat as compelled speech does, the case of compelled association shares with 
educational efforts that the site of influence is more dynamic and possibly bi-directional.   
These reasons, in combination with the special urgency of establishing a foundation for equal 
citizenship and informed autonomy, strike me as providing sufficient grounds for regarding 
Barnette-for-children as apt but Dale-for-children suspect.
More could be said here but I want at least to acknowledge a second possible objection.  
One might question my suggestion that Dale should be understood as a case about children 
and their exercise of associational liberty.  The case of the Boy Scouts might be thought to 
implicate the associational interests of adults – either the adults who run and participate in the 
organization or the parents of the children who participate.  Despite some preliminary efforts 
at investigation, I do not know enough about the Boy Scouts’ organizational structure and 
mission to assess whether it is best understood as an organization of children organized by 
adults, of adults for children, or some mixture that defies clean description.
Briefly, the direction I want to go in here is to suggest that even if it is an organization of 
adults for children, that the associational liberty of adults should not be understood to extend 
in that far because associational liberty rights are more limited and self-regarding; they 
should be more qualified when associations involve children than they would be if only 
adults were involved.  The case for an associational right of unrelated adults seems to me to 
be weak, both because of the interests children have in exposure to a wide range of influences 
and because, generally, the argument for associational rights becomes strained when it 
involves a claim to be able to command or control the associational practices of other people 
than oneself.  The exception to this generality may be the family.  The best case for 
recognizing a strong association right in the case of the Boy Scouts is to think of the Boy 
Scouts as an association of parents and their children, one that involves other adults as well to 
promote its purposes, and of the association right of the parents as flowing from the parental 
rights recognized in Meyer and Pierce.  
I think there is strong reason to be ambivalent about Meyer and Pierce.68  On the one 
hand, as I have argued above, children and the community have an interest in ensuring that 
children have a broad range of influences and experiences that allow them to develop their 
autonomous capacities and that provide them with information to facilitate a more informed 
exercise of the autonomy rights they will later fully enjoy.  Fostering children’s development 
and protecting their autonomy rights may require that we provide a buffer against parental 
control of children where its exercise might eclipse important opportunities for children.
On the other hand, I do not think Meyer and Pierce are easily dismissed as clearly wrong 
once one attends more fully to the neglected interests of children.  Although they are usually 
considered substantive due process cases, there are strong First Amendment underpinnings to 
their results, especially on the account I have been developing.  As I have argued, citizens 
have interests in having some measure of control over those they associate closely with—not 
just from a privacy standpoint but from a First Amendment standpoint – since close 
associations among moral agents tend (and should tend) to engender sympathy, 
identification, and a powerful influence on one’s thoughts and one’s mental agenda.  Looked 
at this way, Pierce in particular can be seen as a First Amendment case.  Put most bluntly and 
in exaggerated form, if the state is able both to compel education and to exercise complete 
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control over the content of the education of the child, it is as though it is able to insert a state 
agent into the home.  We need not posit a religious need to have one’s children share one’s 
point of view or one’s practice in order to practice one’s own religion fully and then try to 
formulate a free exercise interest in order to posit a First Amendment concern here.  The 
same mind-control concerns articulated earlier in the paper have great traction here.  Put less 
dramatically, individuals, as thinkers, have an interest in safe havens for thinking freely and 
with privacy, both from scrutiny and from persistent counter-influence, especially that sort of 
counter-influence that exploits character virtues.  They have, as I argued above, an interest in 
havens in which they may develop their thoughts in trusting relationships with others.  The 
family and the home are obvious venues to locate these havens, both because of the close 
emotional ties family members cultivate and because of the dominance of the home in 
everyday life.  Notice too that this argument provides a relatively simple route from the First 
Amendment to Griswold v. Connecticut.69  The right to contracept may be seen as derivative 
of the First Amendment right of association that naturally encompasses the family and 
includes, within its sweep, a strong right to exclude unwanted members from the circle of 
trusted intimates.
If we affirm some right to raise children (both to procreate and to adopt), then it seems 
there is a case for Pierce on First Amendment grounds.  But given the other concerns raised 
about children’s autonomy interests as well as their need to be treated as equals and to be 
trained in treating others as equals, that case is at best an uneasy and tempered one for a 
number of reasons.70  Children’s interests in developing the capacities for a fully autonomous 
life provide some pull against an unconstrained parental right to dictate the terms of 
69 381 US 479 (1965).
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children’s encounters and education, especially since parenting, and hence, susceptibility to 
parental duties, for most, is optional.  The strength of the case for Pierce also wanes to the 
extent that the state implements autonomous teaching methods.  That is, if the state exposes 
children to a wide range of views but does not attempt to indoctrinate children,71 then there is 
more to the argument that parents have the opportunity to offer counter-instruction and 
engage productively in influencing children’s intellectual development.  Of course, one may 
retain a healthy skepticism that local schools will hue to these educational ideals, even if 
constitutionally mandated.  Compliance concerns may well tip the balance in favor of a 
parental right to educate privately.
Even if Meyer and Pierce are sustainable, the case for claiming that the Boy Scouts’ 
exclusion of gay leaders is an extension of parental associational liberty seems like a shaky 
step.  The  argument for associational liberty protected by Meyer and Pierce has significant 
traction because the state’s efforts to influence children operate children through mandatory 
education regulations.  Further, daily schooling has a pervasive presence in a child’s life.  By 
contrast, in the case of the Boy Scouts and other social organizations, participation in the 
organization is not mandated by the state.  The influence feared by some parents of gay 
leaders on children, and hence indirectly, on parents, is one that parents may already elect to 
opt out of.72  Further, its operations are not as time-consuming and pervasive. So some of the 
concerns about infiltration of the save haven for the mind of the home are less powerful here 
71
 See discussion in Blasi and Shiffrin supra note 27 at 474; see also Martin  Redish and Kevin 
Finnerty,”What Did You Learn In School Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-
Educational Paradox,” 88 Cornell L. Rev. 62 (2002).
72
 This is not to say that participation in social associations is not important for children and perhaps even 
necessary for their well-being and development.  But, I do not think we have to be fully accommodating of 
parents who want to insulate their children entirely from diverse experiences just because we recognize that these 
parents are sincere and are trying to provide for their children.  At some point, state interests in respecting 
equality and regulating bigotry may have an arena for expression.  Parents who disagree may have to make some 
hard choices.  This in itself does not seem overly problematic, especially since the approach already respects 
their association interests by allowing private schooling.  Religious associations for children may also represent 
an additional arena for stronger parental control as free exercise concerns may weigh in the balance to dictate 
greater exclusionary powers.  
and the interests in providing children a range of experiences and training in moral behavior 
may come to the fore.  A hybrid approach of this sort would permit parents to exercise 
substantial influence over their children’s lives as well as their own home life, without giving 
them complete control over children.  I believe this flexibility and compromise to be a virtue 
of the approach.73
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